Since he deserted the concert stage during the 60's the Canadian pianist Glenn Gould has confined his work to records, television, and radio. There is some disagreement amongst critics as to whether Gould is always, or only sometimes, a convincing interpreter of one or another piano piece, but there is scarcely a doubt that each of his performances now is at least special. One example of how Gould has been operating recently seems rather suited for discussion here. A few years back, Gould issued a record of his performance of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony in the Liszt piano transcription. Quite aside from the surprise one felt because the piece was so eccentric a choice even for the arch-eccentric Gould, who had always been associated with classical music, there were a number of other oddities about this particular release. The piece was not only of the nineteenth century, but of its most discredited aspect, pianistically speaking: the aspect that did not content itself with transforming the concert experience into a feast for the virtuoso's self-exhibition, but also raided the literature of other instruments, making of their music a flamboyant occasion for the pianist's skill. Most transcriptions tend on the whole to sound thick or muddy, since frequently the piano is attempting to copy the texture of an orchestral or organ sound. Liszt's Fifth Symphony was less offensive than most transcriptions, mainly because it was brilliantly reduced for the piano, but even at its most clear the sound was an unusual one for Gould to be producing. His sound previously had been the clearest and most unadorned of all pianists', which was why he had the uncanny ability to turn Bach's counterpoint into almost a visual experience. The Liszt transcription, in short, was an entirely different idiom, yet Gould was very successful in it. He sounded as Lisztian now as he had sounded Bachian in the past.

Nor was this all. Accompanying the main disc was another one, a longish, informal interview between Gould, and as I recall, a record company executive. During the interview Gould told his interlocutor that one reason for his escape from "live" performance was the development of a bad
habit in his pianism. On his tours of the Soviet Union, for example, he would notice that the large halls in which he was performing caused him perforce to distort the phrases in a Bach Partita—here he demonstrated by playing the distorted phrases—so that he could more effectively "catch" and address his listeners in the eighth balcony. He then played the same phrases to illustrate how much more correctly, and less seductively, he was performing music, now that there was no audience actually present.

It may seem a little heavy-handed to draw out some of the little ironies from this situation—transcription, interview, and illustrated performance styles all included. But it serves my main point about Gould and the Fifth Symphony: that any occasion involving the aesthetic document or experience on the one hand, and the critic's role and his "worldliness" on the other, cannot be a simple one. Indeed Gould's strategy is something of a parody of all the directions we might take in trying to get at what occurs between the world and the aesthetic object. Here was a pianist who had once represented the ascetic performer in the service of the music, transformed now into unashamed virtuoso, whose principal aesthetic position is supposed to be little better than that of a musical whore. And this from a man who leaves the rectial stage for having caused him to solicit his audience's attention by altering his playing; and this from a man who markets his record as a "first" and then adds to it, not more music, but the kind of attention-getting, and immediacy, gained in a personal interview. And finally this fixed on a mechanically repeatable object, which controlled the most obvious signs of immediacy (Gould's voice, the peacock-like style of the Liszt transcription, the brash informality of an interview packed along with a disembodied performance) beneath, or inside (or was it outside?) a dumb, anonymous, and disposable disc of black plastic.

If one thinks about Gould and his record, parallels will emerge out of the circumstances of written performance. First of all, there is the reproducible material existence of a text. Both a recording and a printed object are subject to similar legal, political, economic and social constraints, so far as their sustained production and distribution are concerned; why and how they are distributed are different matters, and those need not occupy us here. The main thing is that a written text of the sort we care about is originally the result of some immediate contact between author and medium. Thereafter it can be reproduced for the benefit of the world; however much the author demurs at the publicity he receives, once he lets the text go into more than one copy his work is in the world.

Second, a written and musical performance are both instances on some level at least of style, in the simplest and least honorific sense of that
very complex phenomenon. Once again I must arbitrarily exclude all the more interesting complexities that go into making up the very question of style, in order to insist on style as, from the standpoint of producer and receiver, the recognizeable, repeatable, preservable sign of an author who reckons with an audience. Even if the audience is as restricted as his self and as wide as the whole world, the author's style is partially a phenomenon of repetition and reception. But what makes style receivable as the signature of its author's manner is a collection of features variously called idiolect, voice, or more firmly, irreducible individuality. The paradox is that something as impersonal as a text, or a record, can nevertheless deliver an imprint or a trace of something as lively, immediate and transitory as a “voice.” Glenn Gould's interview simply makes brutally explicit the frequent need for recognition that a text carries even in its most pristine, enshrined form; a text needs to show how it bears a personality, for which a common analogy is a talking voice addressing someone. Considered as I have been considering it, style neutralizes, if it does not cancel, the worldlessness, the silent, seemingly uncircumstanced existence of a solitary text. It is not only that any text, if it is not immediately destroyed, is a network of often colliding forces, but also that a text in its being a text is a being in the world; it addresses anyone who reads as Gould does throughout the very same record that is supposed to represent both his withdrawal from the world and his “new” silent style of playing without a live audience.

Of course, however, texts do not speak in the ordinary sense of the word. Yet any simple diametric opposition that is asserted between speech (or that aspect of speech described by Paul Ricoeur as the situation of discourse and the function of reference) and the text as an interception or suspension of speech's worldliness is, I think, misleading and grossly simplified. Here is how Ricoeur puts this opposition, which he claims to be setting up only for the sake of analytic clarification:

In speech the function of reference is linked to the role of the situation of discourse within the exchange of language itself: in exchanging speech, the speakers are present to each other, but also to the circumstantial setting of discourse, not only the perceptual surroundings, but also the cultural background known by both speakers. It is in relation to this situation that discourse is fully meaningful: the reference to reality is in the last analysis reference to that reality which can be pointed out “around,” so to speak, the instance of discourse itself. Language... and in general all the ostensive indicators of language serve to anchor discourse in the circumstantial reality which surrounds the instance of discourse. Thus, in living speech, the ideal meaning of what one says bends towards a real reference, namely to that “about which” one speaks...

This is no longer the case when a text takes the place of speech... A text... is not without reference; it will be precisely the task of reading, as interpretation,
to actualize the reference. At least, in this suspension wherein reference is deferred, in the sense that it is postponed, a text is somehow "in the air" outside of the world or without a world; by means of this obliteration of all relation to the world, every text is free to enter into relation with all the other texts which come to take the place of the circumstantial reality shown by living speech.¹

I cannot see that such an idealization of the difference between speech and writing is useful. Speech and circumstantial reality exist, according to Ricoeur, in a state of presence, in reality, in the world; writing, the text, exist in a state of suspension—that is, outside circumstantial reality—until they are "actualized" and made present by the reader-critic. There are so many things wrong with this set of ideas that I scarcely know where to begin my attack. Ricoeur makes it seem as if the text and circumstantial reality, or what I shall call worldliness, play a game of musical chairs with each other, one intercepting and replacing the other according to fairly crude signals. But where does this game take place we might ask? Certainly not in reality, but in the interpreter's head, a locale presumably without worldliness or circumstantiality. The critic-interpreter has his position reduced to that of a central bourse on whose floor occurs the transaction by which the text is shown to be meaning X while saying Y. And what Ricoeur calls "deferred reference," what becomes of it during the interpretation? Quite simply, on the basis of a model of direct exchange, it comes back, brought back whole and actual by the critic's reading.

I suppose the principal difficulty with all this is that Ricoeur assumes, quite without sufficient argument, that circumstantial reality, worldliness as I shall call it, is symmetrically and exclusively the property of speech or the speech situation, or what the writer would have wanted to say had he been able to, had he not instead chosen to write. My contention is that worldliness does not come and go, nor is it here and there in the apologetic and soupy way by which we often designate history, a euphemism in such cases for the impossibly vague notion that all things take place in history. Moreover a critic may often be, but is not merely, the alchemical translator of texts into circumstantial reality or worldliness; for he too is subject to and a producer of circumstances, and these are felt regardless of whatever objectivity his method possesses. Texts have ways of existing, both theoretical and practical, that even in their most rarefied form are always enmeshed in circumstance, time, place and society—in short, they are in the world, and hence are worldly.² The same is doubtless true of the critic, as reader and as writer. I shall not be hammering away at these points so much as, in the main part of this essay, trying to note them, to illustrate them as concretely as possible,

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given the very complex circumstances surrounding and involving all verbal activity.

If my use of Gould's recording of the Beethoven Fifth Symphony served any serious purpose it was to have provided an instance of a quasi-textual object whose ways of engaging the world are both numerous and complicated, more complicated than the demarcation drawn between text and speech by Ricoeur. These engagements are what I have been calling worldliness. But my principal concern here is not with an aesthetic object in general, but rather with the text in particular. Most critics will subscribe to the notion, a sloppy one I think, that every literary text, for example, is in some way burdened with its occasion, with the brute empirical realities out of which it emerged. Pressed too far such a notion earns the justified polemic of a stylistician, like Michael Riffaterre, who in an essay entitled "The Self-Sufficient Text" calls any reduction of a text to its circumstances a fallacy, biographical, genetic, psychological, or analogic. Most critics would probably go along with Riffaterre in saying, yes, let us make sure that the text does not disappear under the weight of these fallacies, but, and here I speak mainly for myself, they are not entirely satisfied with the idea of a self-sufficient text. Is the alternative to the various fallacies only a quite hermetic textual cosmos, a cosmos whose significant dimension of meaning is, as Riffaterre says, a wholly inward one? Is there no way of dealing with a text and its worldliness fairly? Is there no way to grapple with the problems of literary language except by cutting those off from the more plainly urgent ones of everyday worldly language?

I have found a way of starting to deal with these questions in an unexpected place, which is why I shall seem to be digressing now from the immediate subject at hand in order to describe a somewhat distant problematic. Several years ago I had the leisure to explore the relatively untapped field of Arabic linguistic speculation. At the time I had been very interested, as I still am, in speculation about language in Europe, that is, in that special combination of theoretical imagination and empirical observation characterizing romantic philology, the rise of linguistics in the early nineteenth century, and the whole rich phenomenon of what Foucault has called the discovery of language. I was staggered at my discovery amongst Islamic linguists, during the eleventh century in Andalusia, of a remarkably sophisticated and unexpectedly prophetic school of philosophic grammarians, whose polemics anticipate in an uncanny way twentieth century debates between structuralists and generative grammarians, between descriptivists and behaviorists. Nor was this all. I discovered a small group of linguists whose energies were directed against tendencies amongst rival linguists to turn the question of mean-

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ing in language into esoteric and allegorical exercises. I am referring to three linguists and theoretical grammarians, Ibn Hazm, Ibn Ginni, and Ibn Mada’ al-Qurtobi, all of Cordova, all of the eleventh century, all Zahirites, all antagonists of Batinism. The latter philosophers—as their name implies—believe that meaning in language is concealed within the words; meaning is therefore available only as the result of what we would call an inward-tending exegesis. The Zahirites—their name derives from the word in Arabic for clear and apparent and phenomenal—argued for the surface meaning of words, a meaning anchored to a particular usage, circumstance,*historical and religious anomaly.

The two opponents trace their origins back to readings of the sacred text, the Koran, and how that unique event—for the Koran, unlike the Bible, is an event—is to be read, understood, transmitted and taught by later generations of believers. The Cordovan Zahirites attacked the excesses of the Batinists, arguing that the very profession of grammar (in Arabic nahu) was an invitation to spinning out private meanings in an otherwise divinely pronounced text. According to Ibn Mada’ it was absurd even to associate grammar with a logic of understanding, since as a science grammar simply assumed, even created reasons and functions for language use that implied a hidden level beneath words, available only to private initiates.4 Once you resort to such a level anything more or less becomes permissible in the way of interpretation: there can be no strict meaning, no control over what words in fact say, no responsibility toward the words. The Zahirite effort was to restore, and rationalize a system of reading a text in which attention was focused on the words themselves, not on hidden meanings they might contain. The Cordovan Zahirites in particular went very far in trying to provide a reading system placing the tightest possible control over the reader and his circumstances by means of a theory of the text.

I cannot here go into this theory in detail. What I can do, however, is indicate how the controversy itself is endemic to a circumstantial, or if you like, a worldly notion of the sacred text, a notion which essentially puts a line of demarcation between Islam and the main Judeo-Christian textual traditions. There is a very brilliant and concise account of this difference in Roger Arnaldez’s book on Ibn Hazm, and I can do little better than paraphrase some of his observations. The Judeo-Christian text, at whose centre is Revelation, cannot be reduced to a specific point of impact by which the Word of God entered the world; rather the Word enters human history, all along that history, continually, and by that therefore a very important place is given to what Arnaldez calls “human factors” in the reception, transmission and understanding of such a text.5 By contrast the Koran is the result of a unique event, the “descent” into

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worldliness of a text, whose language and form are thereafter to be viewed as stable, complete, unchanging; the language of the text is Arabic, therefore a greatly privileged language, and its vessel a messenger, Mohammed, similarly privileged. Such a text is an absolute and cannot be referred back to any particular interpreter or interpretation, although this is clearly what the Batinites tried to do (perhaps, it is suggested, under the influence of Judeo-Christian exegetical techniques). Arnaldez puts his description of the Koran in the following terms: the Koran speaks of historical events, yet is not itself historical. It repeats past events, which it condenses and particularizes, yet it is not itself an actually lived experience; it ruptures the human continuity of life; God does not enter temporality by a sustained and/or concerted act. The Koran evokes the memory of actions whose content repeats itself eternally in ways identical with itself, as warnings, orders, imperatives, punishments, rewards (Grammaire et théologie, p. 12). In short, the Zahirite position adopts a view of the Koran that is absolutely circumstantial and worldly, without at the same time making that worldliness dominate the actual sense of the text—this is the ultimate avoidance of vulgar determinism in the Zahirite position.

Hence Ibn Hazm’s linguistic theory is based upon an analysis of the imperative mode since at its most radical and verbal the Koran, according to Ibn Hazm, is a text controlled by two paradigmatic imperatives, iger—read, or recite, and qul—tell (Grammaire et théologie, p. 69). Since those imperatives obviously control the circumstantial, worldly and historical appearance of the Koran (and its uniqueness as an event), and since they must also control uses (that is, readings) of the text thereafter, Ibn Hazm connects his analysis of the imperative mode with a juridical notion of hadd, a word meaning both a logico-grammatical definition and a limit. What transpires in the imperative mode, between the injunctions to read and write, is the delivery of an utterance (khabar in Arabic, translated by Arnaldez as enoncé), which is the verbal realization of a signifying intention, nivah. Now the signifying intention is synonymous not with a psychological intention but exclusively with a verbal intention, itself something highly worldly—that is, it takes place exclusively in the world, it is occasional and circumstantial in both a very precise and wholly pertinent way. To signify is only to use language, and to use language is to do so according to certain rules, rules lexical and syntactic, by which language is in and of the world; by that the Zahirite means that language is regulated by real usage, and neither by abstract prescription nor by speculative freedom. Above all language stands between man and a vast indefiniteness: if the world is a gigantic system of correspondences then it is verbal form—language in actual grammatical
use—that allows us to isolate amongst these correspondences the denominated object. Thus, as Arnaldez puts it, fidelity to such true aspects of language is an askesis of the imagination (Grammaire et théologie, p. 77). A word has a strict meaning understood as an imperative, and with that meaning also a strictly ordained series of resemblances (correspondences) to other words and meanings, which play, strictly, around the first word. Thus figurative language (as it occurs even in the Koran), otherwise elusive and at the mercy of the virtuosic interpreter, is part of the actual, not virtual, structure of language, part therefore of the collectivity of language users.

What Ibn Hazm does, Arnaldez reminds us, is to view language as possessing two seemingly antithetical characteristics: one, that of a divinely ordained institution, unchanging, immutable, logical, rational, intelligible; and two, that of an instrument existing as pure contingency, that is, as an institution signifying meanings anchored in specific utterances (Grammaire et théologie, p. 80). It is exactly because the Zahirite sees language in this double perspective that he rejects reading techniques that reduce words and their meanings back to radicals from which (in Arabic at least) they may be seen grammatically to derive. Each utterance is its own occasion, and as such is firmly anchored in the worldly context in which it is applied. And because the Koran, which is the paradigmatic case of divine-and-human language, is a text that incorporates speaking and writing, reading and telling, Zahirite interpretation itself accepts as inevitable not the separation between speech and writing, nor the disjunction between a text and its circumstantiality, but rather their necessary interplay. It is this field of interaction that makes meaning; indeed that makes meaning (in the severe Zahirite sense of the word) at all possible.

I have summarized very quickly an enormously complex theory in which I myself am still an uncertain novice. I cannot claim any particular influence for such a theory, certainly not in Western European literature since the Renaissance, perhaps not even in Arabic literature since the Middle Ages. But what has struck me very forcibly about this whole theory is that it represents a considerably articulated thesis for dealing with a text as significant form, in which—and I put this as carefully as I can—worldliness, circumstantiality, the text’s status as an event having sensuous particularity as well as historical contingency, are incorporated in the text, are an infrangible part of its capacity for producing and conveying meaning. This means that a text has a specific situation, a situation that places restraints upon the interpreter and his interpretation not because the situation is hidden within the text as a mystery, but rather because the situation exists at the same level of more or less surface
particularity as the textual object itself. There are many ways for conveying such a situation, and I shall be considering some examples presently. But what I will be drawing attention to is an ambition on the part of a writer to deliver his text as an object whose interpretation—by virtue of the exactness of its situation in the world—*has already commenced* and is therefore already constrained, and constraining, its interpretation. Such a text can thereafter be construed as having need at most of complementary, as opposed to supplementary, reading.

II

My principal task now is to discuss ways by which texts impose constraints and limits upon their interpretation. Recent critical theory has placed undue emphasis upon the limitlessness of interpretation. Part of this emphasis has been due to a conception of the text as existing entirely within a hermetic, Alexandrian textual universe, having no connection with actuality. This is a view I oppose, not simply because texts are in the world, but also because as texts they *place* themselves—that is, one of their functions as texts is to place themselves—and they *are* themselves by acting, in the world. Moreover, their manner of doing this is to place restraints upon what can be done with (and to) them interpretively.

Modern literary history gives us a number of examples of writers whose text, as a text, incorporates quite explicitly the circumstances of its very concretely imagined, and even described, situation. One type of author—of which I shall be discussing three instances, Hopkins, Wilde, and Conrad—conceives his text as supported explicitly by a discursive situation involving speaker and audience; the designed interplay between speech and reception, between verbality and textuality is the text’s situation, its placing of itself in the world.

The three authors I mentioned wrote their major work between 1875 and 1915. The subject matter of their writing varies so widely amongst them that similarities between the three have to be looked for elsewhere. Let me begin with a journal entry by Hopkins:

The winter was called severe. There were three spells of frost with skating, the third beginning on Feb. 9. No snow to speak of till that day. Some days before Feb. 7 I saw catkins hanging. On the 9th there was snow but not lying on the roads. On the grass it became a crust lifted on the heads of the blades. As we went down a field near Caesar’s Camp I noticed it before me *squalentem*, coat below coat, sketched in intersecting edges bearing ‘idiom’, all down the slope: —I have no other word yet for that which takes the eye or mind in a bold hand or effective sketching or in marked features or again in graphic writing, which not being beauty nor true inscape yet gives interest and makes ugliness even better than meaninglessness.6
Hopkins’ earliest writing attempts like this to render scenes from nature as exactly as possible. Yet he is never a passive transcriber since for him “this world then is word, expression, news of God” (Journals and Papers, p. 129). Every phenomenon in nature, he wrote in the sonnet “As Kingfishers catch fire,” tells itself in the world as a sort of lexical unit: “Each mortal thing does one thing and the same: / Deals out that being indoors each one dwells; / Selves—goes itself; myself it speaks and spells, / Crying What I do is me: for that I came.” So in the notebook entry Hopkins’ observation of nature is dynamic. He sees in the frost an intention to speak or mean, its layered coats taking one’s attention because of the idiom it bears towards meaning or expression. The writer is as much a respondent as he is a describer: similarly the reader is a full participant in the production of meaning, being obliged as a mortal thing to do—that is, to act—himself, to produce the sense that even though ugly is better than meaninglessness.

This dialectic of production is everywhere present in Hopkins’ work. Writing is telling; nature is telling; reading is telling. He wrote to Robert Bridges on May 21, 1878 that in order to do a certain poem justice “you must not slovenly read it with the eyes but with your ears, as if the paper were declaiming it at you.... Stress is the life of it.” Seven years later he specified more strictly that “poetry is the darling child of speech, of lips and spoken utterance: it must be spoken; till it is spoken it is not performed, it does not perform, it is not itself. Sprung rhythm gives back to poetry its true soul and self. As poetry is emphatically speech, speech purged of dross like gold in the furnace, so it must have emphatically the essential elements of speech.” So close is the identification in Hopkins’ mind between world, word and the utterance, the three coming alive together as a moment of performance, that there is no need of critical intervention. It is the written text that provides the immediate circumstantial reality for the poem’s “play” (the word is Hopkins’). So far from being a document associated with other lifeless, worldless texts, Hopkins’ own text was for him his child; when he destroyed his poems he spoke of the slaughter of the innocents, and everywhere in his career he speaks of writing as the exercise of his male gift. At the moment of greatest desolation in his career, in such a poem as “To R.B.,” the urgency of his feeling of poetic aridity is expressed biologically throughout. When he comes to describe finally what it is he now writes he says:

O then if in my lagging lines you miss
The roll, the rise, the carol, the creation,
My winter world, that scarcely breathes that bliss
Now, yields you, with some sighs, our explanation.

(Poems, p. 108)
Because his text has lost its ability to incorporate the stress of creation, and because it is no longer performance but what in another poem he calls "dead letters" he now can only write an explanation, which is lifeless speech "bending towards a real reference" (pace Ricoeur).

It was said of Wilde by one of his contemporaries that everything he spoke sounded as if it were enclosed in quotation marks. This is no less true of everything he wrote, for such was the consequence of having a pose, which Wilde defined as "a formal recognition of the importance of treating life from a definite reasoned standpoint." Or as Algernon retorts to Jack's accusation that "you always want to argue about things" in The Importance of Being Earnest: "That's exactly what things were originally made for." Always ready with a quotable comment, Wilde filled his manuscripts with epigrams on every conceivable subject. Everything he wrote was intended either for more comment or for quotation or, most important, for tracing back to him. There are obvious social reasons for some of this egoism, which Wilde made no attempt to conceal in his quip "To love oneself is the beginning of a life-long romance," but they do not exhaust the speech of Wilde's style. Having forsaken action, life and nature for their incompleteness and diffusion Wilde took as his province a theoretical, ideal world in which, as he told Alfred Douglas in De Profundis, conversation was the basis of all human relations. Since conflict inhibited conversation as Wilde understood it from the Platonic dialogue, the mode of interchange was to be by epigram. This epigram is Wilde's radical of presentation: a compact utterance capable of the utmost range of subject matter, the greatest authority, and the least equivocation as to its author. When he invaded other forms of art Wilde converted them into longer epigrams. As he said of drama: "I took the drama, the most objective form known to art, and made it as personal a mode of expression as the lyric or the sonnet, at the same time that I widened its range and enriched its characterization" (De Profundis, p. 80). No wonder he could say: "I summed up all systems in a phrase, and all existence in an epigram" (De Profundis, p. 81).

De Profundis records the destruction of the utopia, whose individualism and unselfish selfishness Wilde had adumbrated in The Soul of Man Under Socialism. From a free world to a prison and a circle of suffering: how is the change accomplished? Wilde's conception of freedom was to be found in the The Importance of Being Earnest, where conflicting characters turn out to be brothers after all just because they say they are. What is written down (for example, the Army Lists consulted by Jack) merely confirms what all along has been capriciously, but stylistically, said. This transformation, from opponent into brother, is what
Wilde had in mind in connecting the intensification of personality with its multiplication. When the communication between men no longer possesses the freedom of conversation, when it is confined to the merely legal liability of print, which is not ingenuously quotable but because it is has been signed is now criminally actionable, the utopia crumbles. As he reconsidered his life in *De Profundis* Wilde's imagination was transfixed by the effects of one text upon his life. But he uses it to show how in going from speech to print, which in a sense all of his other more fortunate texts had managed somehow to avoid by virtue of their epigrammatic individuality, he had been ruined. Wilde's lament in what follows is that a text has too much, not too little, circumstantial reality, and hence, the Wildean paradox, its vulnerability:

You send me a very nice poem, of the undergraduate school of verse, for my approval: I reply by a letter of fantastic literary conceits... Look at the history of that letter! It passes from you into the hands of a loathsome companion: from him to a gang of blackmailers: copies of it are sent about London to my friends, and to the manager of the theatre where my work is being performed: every construction but the right one is put on it: Society is thrilled with the absurd rumours that I have had to pay a huge sum of money for having written an infamous letter to you: this forms the basis of your father's worst attack: I produce the original letter myself in Court to show what it really is: it is denounced by your father's counsel as a revolting and insidious attempt to corrupt Innocence: ultimately it forms part of a criminal charge: the Crown takes it up: the Judge sums up on it with little learning and much morality: I go to prison for it at last. That is the result of writing you a charming letter (*De Profundis*, pp. 34-35).

For in a world described by George Eliot as a "huge whispering gallery" the effects of writing can be grave indeed: "As the stone which has been kicked by generations of clowns may come by curious little links of effect under the eyes of a scholar, through whose labours it may at last fix the date of invasions and unlock religions, so a bit of ink and paper which has long been an innocent wrapping or stop-gap may at last be laid open under the one pair of eyes which have knowledge enough to turn it into the opening of a catastrophe." If Dr. Causabon's caution has a purpose at all it is by rigid secrecy and an endlessly postponing scriptive will to forestall "the opening of a catastrophe." Yet he cannot succeed since Eliot is at pains to show that even his tremendously nursed Key is a text, and therefore in the world. Unlike Wilde's, Causabon's disgrace is posthumous, but their textual implication takes place for the same reason, which is their commitment to what Eliot calls an "embroiled medium."

Lastly let me consider Conrad. Elsewhere I have described the extraordinary *presentational* mode of his narratives, how each of them, almost without exception, dramatizes, motivates, and circumstances the
occasion of its telling, how all of Conrad’s work is really made out of secondary, reported speech, and how the interplay between appeals to the eye and the ear in his work is highly organized and subtle and is that work’s meaning.\textsuperscript{14} The Conradian encounter is not simply between a man and his destiny embodied in a moment of extremity but, just as persistently, it is the encounter between speaker and hearer. Marlow is Conrad’s chief invention for this encounter, Marlow with his haunting knowledge that a man such as Kurtz or Jim “existed for me, and after all it is only through me that he exists for you.”\textsuperscript{15}

The chain of humanity—“we exist only in so far as we hang together” (\textit{Lord Jim}, p. 160)—is the transmission of actual speech, and existence, from one mouth, and then after that, from one eye, to another. Every text that Conrad wrote, whether formally, aesthetically, or thematically considered, presents itself as unfinished and still in the making. “And besides, the last word is not said,—probably shall never be said. Are not our lives too short for that full utterance which through all our stammerings is of course our only and abiding intention?” (\textit{Lord Jim}, p. 161). Texts convey the stammerings, but that full utterance, the statement of wholly satisfactory presence, remains distant, attentuated somewhat by a grand gesture like Jim’s self-sacrifice, which closes off a text circumstantially without in any way emptying it of its actual urgency. Quite the contrary.

This is a good time to remark that the Western novelistic tradition, from \textit{Don Quixote} and after, is full of examples of texts insisting not only upon their circumstantial reality but also upon their status as already fulfilling a function, a reference, or a meaning \textit{in the world}. Cervantes and Cide Hamete come immediately to mind. More impressive is Richardson playing the role of mere editor for \textit{Clarissa}, “simply” placing those letters in successive order after they have done what they have done, arranging to fill the text with printer’s devices, reader’s aids, analytical contents, retrospective meditations, commentary, so that a collection of letters grows to fill the world and occupy all space, to become a circumstance as large and as engrossing as the reader’s understanding itself. Surely the novelistic imagination has always included this unwillingness to cede control over the text in the world, or to release it from the discursive and human obligations of all human presence; hence, the desire, which is almost a principal action of many novels, to turn the text back, if not directly into speech, then at least into circumstantial, as opposed to meditative duration.

No novelist, however, can be quite as explicit about circumstances as Marx is in \textit{The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte}. To my mind no work is as brilliant and as compelling in the exactness with which circumstances (the German word is \textit{Umstande}) are shown to have made the
nephew possible, not as an innovator, but as a farcical repetition of the Uncle. What Marx attacks are the atextual theses that one, history is made up of free events and two, that history is guided by superior individuals. By inserting Louis Bonaparte in a whole intricate system of repetitions, by which first Hegel, then the ancient Romans, then the 1789 revolutionaries, then Napoleon I, then the bourgeois interpreters, then finally the fiascos of 1848-51 are all seen in a pseudo-analogical order of descending worth, increasing derivativeness, and deceptively harmless masquerading, Marx effectively circumstances, textualizes, the random appearance of a new Caesar. Here we have the case of a text itself providing a world historical situation with circumstances otherwise hidden in the deception of a “roi des droles.” What is ironic—and in need of analysis I cannot here give—is how a text, by being a text, by insisting upon and employing all the devices of textuality, preeminent among them repetition, historicizes and problematizes all the fugitive significance that has chosen Louis Bonaparte as its representative.

There is another aspect to what I have been saying about the novel generally, and about Hopkins, Wilde and Conrad. In producing texts with either a firm claim on or an explicit will to worldliness, these writers and genres have valorized speech, making it the tentacle by which an otherwise silent text ties itself into the world of discourse. By the valorization of speech I mean that the discursive, circumstantially dense interchange of speaker facing hearer is made to stand—sometimes misleadingly—for a democratic equality and co-presence in actuality between speaker and hearer. Not only is the discursive relation far from equal in actuality (as I shall be arguing presently) but also the text’s attempt to dissemble by seeming to be open democratically to anyone who might read it, is also an act of bad faith. (Incidentally: one of the strengths of Zahirite theory is that it dispels the illusion that a surface reading, which is the Zahirite ambition, is anything but difficult). Texts of such a length as Tom Jones aim to occupy leisure time of a quality not available to just anyone. Moreover, all texts essentially displace, dislodge other texts or, more frequently, they take the place of something else. As Nietzsche had the perspicacity to see, texts are fundamentally facts of power, not of democratic exchange. They compel attention away from the world even as their beginning intention as texts, coupled with the inherent authoritarianism of the authorial authority (the repetition in this phrase is a deliberate emphasis on some tautology within all texts, since all texts are in some way self-confirmatory) makes for sustained power.

Yet in the patrimony of texts there is a first text, a sacred prototype, a scripture, which the reader is always approaching through the text before him either as petitioning suppliant or as an initiate amongst many
in a sacred chorus supporting the central patriarchal text. Northrop Frye's theory of literature makes it everywhere apparent that the displacing power in all texts derives finally from the displacing power of the Bible, whose centrality, potency and dominating anteriority inform all Western literature. The same is no less true, in the different modes I discussed earlier, of the Koran and its priority. Both in the Judeo-Christian and in the Islamic traditions these hierarchies repose upon a solidly divine, or quasi-divine, language, a language whose uniqueness is that it is theologically and humanly circumstantial.

It is too often forgotten that modern western philology, which begins in the early nineteenth century, undertook to revise commonly accepted ideas about language and its divine origins. That revision tried first to determine which was the first language and then failing that ambition proceeded thereafter to reduce language to specific circumstances: language groups, historical and racial theories, geographical and anthropological theses. A particularly interesting example of how such investigations went is Ernest Renan's career as a philologist; that was his real profession, and not that of the boring sage. His first serious work was his 1847 analysis of Semitic languages, revised and published in 1855 as the *Histoire générale et système comparé des langues sémitiques*. Without this study the *Vie de Jésus* could not have been written. The accomplishment of the *Histoire générale* was scientifically to describe the inferiority of Semitic languages, principally Hebrew, Aramaic, and Arabic, the medium of three purportedly sacred, spoken (by God) texts, the Torah, the Koran, and later, the derivative Gospels. Thus in the *Vie de Jésus* Renan would be able to insinuate that the so-called sacred texts, delivered by Moses, Jesus, or Mohammed, could not have anything divine in them if the very medium of their supposed divinity as well as the body of their message to and in the world, was made up of such comparatively poor worldly stuff. Renan argued that even if these texts were prior to all others in the West, they held nonetheless only a primitive, not a theologically dominant, position.

Renan first reduced texts from objects of divine intervention in the world's business, to objects of historical materiality; God as author-authority had little value after Renan's philological and textual revisionism. Yet in dispensing with divine authority Renan put philological power in its place. What is born to replace divine authority is the textual authority of the philological critic who has the effective skill to separate Semitic, i.e. Oriental, languages from the languages of Indo-European culture. Not only therefore did Renan kill off the extra-textual validity of the great Semitic sacred texts; he confined them as objects of European study to a scholarly field thereafter to be known as Oriental, and ruled...
by the Orientalist. The Orientalist is a Renan, or a Gobineau, Renan's contemporary quoted here and there in the 1855 edition of the Histoire générale et système comparé des langues sémitiques, for whom the old hierarchy of sacred Semitic texts has been destroyed as if by an act of parricide; the passing of divine authority enables the appearance of European ethnocentrism, by which the methods and the discourse of Western scholarship analyze, characterize, confine inferior non-European cultures into a position of subordination. Oriental texts come to inhabit a realm without development or power—it is a realm that exactly corresponds to the position of a colony for European texts and culture. All this takes place at the same time as the great European colonial empires in the east are at their inception or, in some cases, flourishing.

I have introduced this brief account of the twin origin of the Higher Criticism and of Orientalism as a European scholarly discipline in order to be able to speak about the fallacy of imagining the life of texts as being pleasantly ideal and without force or conflict, and conversely, the fallacy of imagining the discursive relations in actual speech to be, as Ricoeur would have it, a relation of equal copresence between hearer and speaker.

Texts incorporate discourse, sometimes violently in the ways I have been discussing. There are other ways too. Michel Foucault's archeological analyses of what he calls systems of discourse are premised on the thesis, originally adumbrated by Marx and Engels in The German Ideology, that "in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality." Discourse in this passage means what is written, not only what is spoken. Foucault's contention is that the fact of writing itself is a systematic conversion of the power relationship between the controller and the controlled into mere written words; the reason this happens is to let it seem that writing is only writing, whereas writing is one way of disguising the awesome materiality of so tightly controlled and managed a production. Foucault continues:

In a society such as our own we all know the rules of exclusion. The most obvious and familiar of these concerns what is prohibited. We know perfectly well that we are not free to say just anything. We have three types of prohibition, covering objects, ritual with its surrounding circumstances, the privileged or exclusive right to speak of a particular subject; these prohibitions interrelate, reinforce and complement each other, forming a complex web, continually subject to modification. I will note simply that the areas where this web is most tightly woven today, where the danger spots are most numerous, are those dealing with politics and sexuality... In appearance, speech may well be of little account, but the
prohibitions surrounding it soon reveal its links with desire and power... Speech is no mere verbalization of conflicts and systems of domination, but that it is the very object of man's conflicts (Archeology of Knowledge, p. 216).

The discursive situation, despite Ricoeur's disastrous simplification of it, far from being a type of idyllic conversation between equals, is more usually of a kind typefied by the relation between colonizer and colonized, the oppressor and the oppressed. It is too little recalled that amongst the great modernists, Proust and Joyce are instances, there is an acute understanding of this fact; their representations of the discursive situation always show it in this power-political light. A formative moment in Stephen Dedalus's rebellious consciousness occurs as he converses with the English dean of studies:

...What is that beauty which the artist struggles to express from lumps of earth, said Stephen coldly.

The little word seemed to have turned a rapier point of his sensitiveness against this courteous and vigilant foe. He felt with a smart of dejection that the man to whom he was speaking was a countryman of Ben Jonson. He thought: —The language in which we are speaking is his before it is mine. How different are the words home, Christ, ale, master, on his lips and on mine! I cannot speak or write these words without unrest of spirit. His language, so familiar and so foreign, will always be for me an acquired speech. I have not made or accepted its words. My voice holds them at bay. My soul frets in the shadow of his language.

Joyce's ouevre is a recapitulation of those political and racial separations, exclusions, prohibitions instituted ethnocentrically by the ascendant European culture throughout the nineteenth century. The situation of discourse, Stephen Dedalus knows, hardly puts equals across from each other. Rather, discourse places one interlocutor above another, as Fanon brilliantly described it in The Wretched of the Earth, discourse re-enacts the geography of the colonial city, "this world cut in two is inhabited by two different species... where the agents of government speak the language of pure force":

The zone where the natives live is not complementary to the zone inhabited by the settlers. The two zones are opposed, but not in the service of a higher unity. Obedient to the rules of pure Aristotelian logic, they both follow the principle of reciprocal exclusivity. No conciliation is possible, for of the two terms, one is superfluous. The settlers' town is a strongly-built town, all made of stone and steel. It is a brightly-lit town; the streets are covered with asphalt, and the garbage-cans swallow all the leavings, unseen, unknown and hardly thought about. The settler's feet are never visible, except perhaps in the sea; but there you're never close enough to see them. His feet are protected by strong shoes although the streets of his town are clean and even, with no holes or stones. The settler's town is a well-fed town, an easygong town; its belly is always full of good things. The settler's town is a town of white people, of foreigners.

The town belonging to the colonized people, or at least the native town, the ne-
gro village, the medina, the reservation, is a place of ill fame, peopled by men of evil repute. They are born there, it matters little where or how; they die there, it matters not where, nor how. It is a world without spaciousness; men live there on top of each other, and their huts are built on top of the other. The native town is a hungry town, starved of bread, of meat, of shoes, of coal, of light. The native town is a crouching village, a town on its knees, a town wallowing in the mire. It is a town of niggers and dirty arabs. The look that the native turns on the settler's town is a look of lust, a look of envy; it expresses his dreams of possession—all manner of possession: to sit at the settler's table, to sleep in the settler's bed, with his wife if possible. The colonized man is an envious man. And this the settler knows very well; when their glances meet he ascertains bitterly, always on the defensive "They want to take our place". It is true, for there is no native who does not dream at least once a day of setting himself up in the settler's place.

No wonder that the Fanonist solution to such discourse is violence.

My choice of examples, extreme though most of them may have been, has done for me the job of rejecting simple oppositions between texts and the world, or between texts and speech. Too many exceptions, too many historical, ideological and formal circumstances implicate the text in actuality, even if a text may also be considered a silent printed object with its own unheard melodies which play "not to the sensual ear, but, more endearèd, / Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone." The play of forces by which a text is engendered and maintained as a fact not of mute ideality but of production completely dispels the symmetry of even heuristic oppositions. Moreover the textual utopia envisioned each in his own way by T.S. Eliot and Northrop Frye, whose nightmarish converse is Borges's library, is at complete odds with the eccentric, dialectical intermingling of history with form in texts. My thesis is that any centrist, exclusivist conception of the text, or for that matter of the discursive situation as defined wrongly by Paul Ricoeur, ignores the ethnocentrism and the erratic will to power from which texts can spring.

III

But where in all this is the critic and his text?

Scholarship, commentary, exegesis, explication de texte, history of ideas, rhetorical or semiological analyses: all these are modes of pertinence, of attention, to the textual matter usually presented to the critic as already at hand. I shall concentrate now on the essay, which is the traditional form by which criticism has expressed itself. The central problematic of the essay as a form is its place, by which I mean a series of three different but connected ways the essay has of being the form the critic takes, and locates himself in, to do his work. Place therefore involves relations the critic fashions with the texts he addresses, the audi-
ence he addresses; it also involves the dynamic *taking place* of his own
text as it produces itself.

The first mode of place is the essay’s relation to the text it attempts
to approach: how does it come to the text of its choice? how does it enter
that text? what is the concluding definition of its relation to the text it
has dealt with? The second mode of place is the essay’s intention (and the
intention, presumed or perhaps created by the essay, that its audience
has) for attempting an approach: is the critical essay an attempt *to iden-
tify or to identify with* the text of its choice? does it stand between the
text and the reader, or to one side of one of them? how great, or how lit-
tle, is the ironic disparity between its essential formal incompleteness,
because it is *an essay*, and the formal completion of the text it treats?
The third mode of place concerns the essay as a zone in which certain
kinds of occurrences, events, happen as an aspect of the essay’s produc-
tion: what is the essay’s consciousness of its marginality to the text it
discusses? what is the method by which the essay permits history a role
during the making of its own history, that is, as the essay moves from
beginning to development to conclusion? what is the quality of the essay’s
speech, towards, away from, into the *actuality*, the arena of non-textual
historical vitality and presence that is taking place simultaneously with
the essay itself? finally is the essay a text, an intervention between texts,
an intensification of the notion of textuality, or a dispersion of language
away from a contingent page to occasions, tendencies, currents or move-
ments in and for history?

Put as jaggedly and as abstractly as this, these questions are not im-
mEDIATELY answerable. It is entirely possible that my scattering, grape-
shot manner of formulating them prevents, rather than encourages, an-
wers from appearing; also one is tempted perhaps to be impatient and
say that these questions are fairly abstruse solipsisms that take the
critic away from his real business, which is writing criticism *tout court.*
Perhaps. I would argue, however, that a juster response to these ques-
tions—at least this was the effect I had intended—is a realization of how
unfamiliar and how rare such questions are in the general discussion of
contemporary criticism. It is not that the problems of criticism are un-
discussed, but rather that criticism is considered essentially as defined
once and for all by its secondariness, by its temporal misfortune for
having come *after* the text (or texts) it is supposed to be treating. Just
as it is all too often true that texts are thought of as monolithic objects
of the past, to which criticism is a despondent appendage in the present,
then the very conception of criticism symbolizes being outdated, being
dated from the past rather than by the present. Everything I tried earlier
to say about a text—its dialectic of engagement in time and the senses, the
paradoxes in a text by which discourse is shown to be immutable and yet contingent, as fraught and politically intransigent as the struggle between dominant and dominated—all this was an implicit rejection of the secondary after-role usually assigned to criticism. For if we assume instead that texts make up what Foucault calls archival facts, the archive being defined as the text’s social discursive presence in the world, then criticism too is another aspect of that present. In other words one should prefer to say that rather than being defined by the silent past, commanded by it to speak in the present, criticism, no less than any text, is the present in the course of its articulation, struggles for definition, attempts at overcoming.

We must not forget that the critic does not, cannot speak without the mediation of writing, the ambivalent *pharmakon* so suggestively portrayed by Derrida as the constituted milieu where the oppositions are opposed: This is where the movement and the play occur that bring the oppositions into direct contact with each other, that overturn oppositions and transform one pole into another, soul and body, good and evil, inside and outside, memory and oblivion, speech and writing. In particular the critic is committed to the essay, whose metaphysics were sketched by Lukacs in the first chapter of his *Die Seele und die Formen*. There Lukacs said that as a form the essay allows, and indeed is, the coincidence of inchoate soul with exigent material form. Essays are concerned with the relations between things, with values and concepts, in fine, with significance (*Die Seele und die Formen*, p. 12). Whereas poetry deals in images, the essay is the abandonment of images; this abandonment the essay ideally shares in common with Platonism and mysticism (*Die Seele und die Formen*, p. 13). If, Lukacs continues, the various forms of literature are compared with sunlight refracted in a prism, then the essay is ultra-violet light. What the essay expresses is a yearning for conceptuality and intellectuality, as well also as great ultimate questions like what is life or man and destiny (*Die Seele und die Formen*, p. 15). (Throughout his analysis Lukacs refers to the Platonic Socrates as the typical essayistic figure, always talking of immediate mundane matters while at the same time through his life there sounds the purest, the most profound and the most concealed yearning—*Die tiefste, die verborgenste Sehnsucht ertönt aus diesem Leben* [*Die Seele und die Formen*, p.25]).

Thus the essay's mode is ironic, which means first that the form is patently insufficient in its intellectuality with regard to living experience, and second that the very form of the essay, its being an essay, is an ironic destiny with regard to the great questions of life (*Die Seele und die Formen*, p. 17). Socrates's death perfectly symbolizes in its arbitrariness and irrelevance to those questions he debates, the essayistic des-
tiny, or rather the absence of real (i.e. tragic) destiny in the essay; there is no internal conclusion for an essay, for only something outside it can interrupt or end it, as Socrates’s death is decreed offstage and ends his life of questioning. Form fills the function in an essay that images do in poetry: form is the reality of the essay, and form gives the essayist a voice with which to ask questions of life, even if that form must always make use of art—a book, a painting, a piece of music—as the initial subject matter of its investigations (*Die Seele und die Formen*, p. 17).

Lukacs’s analysis of the essay, a small part of which I have summarized only to indicate the kind of thought available to the critic about his extremely complex relations with the world and with his medium, has it in common with Wilde that criticism in general, and the essay in particular, is rarely what it seems, not least in its form. Criticism adopts the mode of commentary on and evaluation of art; yet in reality criticism matters more as necessarily incomplete and preparatory process towards judgment and evaluation. What the critical essay does is to begin to create the values by which art is judged. I said earlier that a major inhibition on the critic is that his function as critic is often dated and circumscribed for him by the past, that is, by an already created work of art. Lukacs acknowledges the inhibition, but he shows how in fact the critic appropriates for himself the function of starting to make values, and therefore the work, he is judging. Wilde said it more flamboyantly: criticism “treats the work of art as a starting point for a new creation” (*Artist as Critic*, p. 367). Lukacs put it more cautiously: the essayist is a pure instance of the precursor ("Der Essayist ist der reine Typus des Vorlaufers") (*Die Seele und die Formen*, p. 29).

I prefer the latter description, for as Lukacs develops it the critic’s position is a vulnerable one because he awaits and prepares for a great aesthetic revolution whose result, ironically enough, will render him marginal. Of course this idea, that consciousness of the possibility of the future, as well as the need in consciousness for a constant conversion of thought from static to dynamic, itself prefigures Lukacs’s later ideas about the role of the proletariat dynamic class consciousness which will bring about the overthrow of bourgeois reification. What I wish to emphasize here in conclusion is not only the critic’s role in writing as dialectically creating the values by which art might be judged and understood, but his role in creating the processes of the present, as process and inauguration, the actual conditions by means of which art and writing bear significance. By this I mean not only what R.P. Blackmur, following Hopkins, called the bringing of literature to performance, but more explicitly, the articulation of those voices dominated, displaced, or silenced by the textuality of texts. Texts are a system of forces institutionalized

21 *The Text, the World, the Critic*
at some expense by the reigning culture, not an ideal cosmos of ideally equal poems. Looking at the Grecian urn Keats sees graceful figures adorning its exterior, and also he actualizes in language (and perhaps nowhere else) the little town “emptied of this folk, this pious morn.” The critic’s attitude to some extent is restorative in a similar way; it should in addition and more often be frankly inventive, in the traditional rhetorical sense of *inventio* employed so fruitfully by Vico, finding and exposing things otherwise lie hidden beneath piety, heedlessness, or routine. Most of all, I think, criticism is worldly and in the world so long as it opposes *monocentrism* in the narrowest as well as the widest sense of that too infrequently used notion: for monocentrism is a concept I take in conjunction with ethnocentrism, the assumption that culture masks itself as the sovereignty of *this* one and *this* human, whereas culture is the process of dominion and struggle always dissembling, always deceiving. Monocentrism is when we mistake one idea as the only idea, instead of recognizing that an idea in history is always one amongst many. Monocentrism denies plurality, it totallizes structure, it sees profit where there is waste, it decrees the concentricity of Western culture instead of its eccentricity, it believes continuity to be given and will not try to understand, instead, how discontinuity as much as continuity is made.

My inclinations now are to say that such worldliness expressed in such denials and affirmations, for criticism is enough: for if this worldliness prepares for a still more liberating one to come after it, then so much the better.

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**Notes**


2 I have discussed this in Chapter Four of *Beginnings: Intention and Method* (New York: Basic Books, 1975).


4 This is the main, polemical point in his tract *Ar-rad’ala'l nuhat*, ed. Shawki Dalī (Cai- ro, 1947). The text dates from 1180 AD.


17 Nietzsche’s analyses of texts in this light are to be found everywhere in his work, but especially in The Genealogy of Morals and in The Will to Power.


23 Georg Lukacs, Die Seele und die Formen (1911); reprinted Berlin: Luchterland, 1971), p. 17.


23 The Text, the World, the Critic