Some Implications of "Process" or "Intersubjectivity": Postmodern Rhetoric

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The purpose of this paper is to show some implications for rhetoric of the scientific and philosophical point of view known as "process" or "intersubjectivity." I will argue that process is the most valuable philosophy for the study of rhetoric, and rhetoric is the most valuable study for the intersubjective philosophy. Development of my argument will be in four stages. The first section of this paper will briefly review the traditional, Newtonian, "mechanistic" world view embodied in some philosophies of science and social science. The second section will, in opposition to mechanistic philosophy, explain the world view implied by process or intersubjectivity. The third section will develop an ethic for rhetoric that is appropriate to intersubjectivity. The fourth section will argue for a mode of inquiry into rhetoric that is appropriate to intersubjectivity. More detailed aims and overviews will be found at the start of each section.

Part I: The Mechanistic Point of View

So here we are together, machines and me.
I feel about as local as a fish in a tree . . .
— John Sebastian

The assumptions and methodology of Newtonian mechanics, in science and as extrapolated to social science, are well known and need not receive extensive explication here. My purpose is to show the metaphysical and epistemological bases of mechanism, bases which the process point of view most directly denies.

Apart from the strictly scientific merits of Newtonian mechanics per se, a metaphysics grew up around it designed to make mechanics seem "objective and necessary." I am concerned with this metaphysic of mechanics since it has been borrowed by many branches of the social sciences. Newtonian mechanics was based on two
tenets: 1) reality is objective, that is to say it exists absolutely and apart from mind, the observer's intentions, or tools of observation, and 2) this objective reality is mechanical, causal, and necessary.

I should stress that this world view is one peculiarly appropriate to Newtonian mechanics. Other schools of science such as quantum mechanics do not accept its metaphysics. To a certain extent, mechanics and its social science offsprings have seen to it that assumptions and disciplines implying antagonistic metaphysics were regarded as unacceptable study. This metaphysics restricts itself and epistemology to the study of the physical which was assumed to be the objective. "In short, all that mattered was matter." Newtonian metaphysics held two assumptions for the role of humanity in this objective reality. First, it was assumed that all of human experience and understanding could be explained by the mechanistic, causal, physical paradigm. What at the moment appeared to be soul, ideas, or will would in time be found to be material. Second, the assumption of reality as causal and determinate placed humanity at the mercy of forces in the environment. A deterministic world view required the belief that humanity could not be an end in itself but merely a cog in the cosmic machine. In psychology the role of inner motivation was taken over by causal factors in the scene. People became "a passive means to some imposed external end."

The incompatibility between this metaphysic and everyday experience shaped an epistemology appropriate to mechanics. Deterministic reality is objective and orderly; yet every day people see incompatible subjective differences, indeterminacy, uncertainty, chance and chaos. If the world is not really like that, then how can humanity come to know that placid world, and why is it that we don't? This was the challenge for mechanistic epistemology.

Why don't people apprehend objective reality directly in everyday experience? Mechanical epistemology answered this question with a dichotomy between appearance and reality. If the observer doesn't immediately apprehend objective reality, mechanics argued, there must be some gap between the knower and the known, between people and reality.

What is the goal of knowledge? To remove those barriers between knower and known, or in other words, to arrive at the truth. Mechanics in the "Modern Age" based its epistemological hopes on the concept of a truth which was as objective, absolute, and empirically verifiable as the reality to which it bore reference.

How to reach the goal of truth? Or, how best to remove those
barriers between knower and known, appearance and reality? Mechanical epistemology was based on two assumptions. First, reason and formal logic were considered most appropriate for the apprehension of an essentially mathematical reality. Second, objectivity was required for the observer. Objectivity was appropriate for the apprehension of truth for two reasons: a) it removed personal bias and shortsightedness which were major alleged causes of the appearance-reality gap, and b) it removed social or moral bias in the form of value or motive nonmechanistic assumptions. This epistemology stemmed directly from the appearance-reality gap. Since the reality half of that gap remained constant and immutable, it was assumed that appearance, or the human side of the chasm, contained the flaw that created the gap. Thus, human (often read "emotional" or "intuitive") factors in observation were rigidly guarded against.

Let me make two observations at this point. First, mechanics begged the question of values and personal experience. Mechanics had to assume that this personal part of life was mechanically structured. But that was an assumption and not derived from other "truths." A person arguing for the integrity of values, intuitions, or personal experience could not be refuted but only ignored or talked around. Second, mechanics looked forward for the day when metaphysics and epistemology would collapse into one, when the dichotomy between the two would be meaningless. This would happen on the day that humankind came to know objective reality. Speculation about human knowledge would then be speculation about reality as well. Mechanics in the modern age saw that as a real if distant inevitability.

The methodology of mechanics was based on the second metaphysical tenet argued above, that of causality and determinacy. A causal reality made two methodological approaches appropriate: reduction, and through reduction, control.

By reduction I mean the simplification of phenomena and the contexts in which they are observed. The parts of systems are studied rather than whole systems. Reduction's goal was to discover the laws of nature which would explain both human and physical activity. With present research tools our understanding of the whole system, including the whole person, is not amenable to the use of mechanistic methodology. Systems and people don't appear to behave causally and determinately. Selected focus upon certain parts of systems and people will reveal subjects that do seem to act
causally, and that is why the mechanist reduces. Paradoxically, once the mechanist has reduced, he/she reconstructs. The reconstruction is not a system but an aggregate: many reduced parts are studied together as a category to determine similarities between them which may be laws of nature. Mechanics in psychology, for example, is not concerned with the whole person or with any part of the person, but rather with an aggregate of parts.

Reduction leads to control in two senses. It leads to experimental control since a concern with only similar parts of systems allows the mechanist to exclude from observation those parts which are deemed irrelevant variables. This allows the mechanist to control that which he/she observes and to concentrate on what are presumably the effects of only the observed. Reduction leads to control in another sense. If reduction is successful in achieving the mechanistic goal of observing objective laws of nature, then by knowing how those laws must operate under certain conditions, the scientist can manipulate conditions and control the motion or experience of the parts that have been isolated. Reduction leads to predictability only if the actions observed are determinate. Mechanics is at heart an extremely pragmatic philosophy and avoids understanding for its own sake; the ability to predict is meaningless in mechanics unless it leads to the ability to control. This urge to manipulate is often extended into the social sciences by mechanists, where an old goal has been the neutral control and manipulation of the body politic.

While many references to mechanistic philosophy have been in the past tense, I must not leave the impression that all this is behind us now. Maslow has complained that mechanics is the mainstream of contemporary psychology, no inconsiderable force in the social sciences. Its major manifestation in psychology is the school of thought known as behaviorism. Of more concern is the growth of the mechanistic viewpoint in speech-communication research, especially in those studies relating to rhetoric. Smith argues that most experimental research in speech that deals with manipulations of variables is deterministic. Smith gives two examples of such prominent researchers in speech: Bowers, making references to prediction and Miller, praising predictability and manipulation. A greater concern to me is not the flow of mechanism into speech, but the reverse. Social psychology is now doing many things that bear directly upon rhetoric, and is doing them mechanistically. Aronson cites Aristotle as "the world's first published social
psychologist," and the footnote is to, maddeningly enough, the Rhetoric! Insko and Schopler view persuasion in clearly mechanistic terms, as a one-way process of a source influencing a target audience. It is the growing tendency to view this process of influencing people and establishing cooperation, rhetoric, in mechanistic terms that I see as the challenge to be faced in this paper.

Part II: "Postmodern" Reality

"She always says, my lord, that facts are like cows. If you look them in the face hard enough they generally run away. She is a very courageous woman, my lord."

— Dorothy L. Sayers

In this section I will discuss a view of reality and knowledge in contrast to that of Newtonian mechanics. This perspective will be called, interchangeably, "process" and "intersubjectivity." Authors using the two terms are, I believe, referring to essentially the same thing.

Science and the direct observation of nature

Mechanics relied upon reason and the scientific method to move closer and closer to the perception of objective reality. It also relied upon avoidance of personal or social and moral bias, which were assumed to create the gap between appearance and reality. I will argue in this subsection that these goals were counterproductive or impossible of attainment.

First, I will defend the thesis that reason and the scientific method, or any method whatsoever, will impede the direct observation of any objective reality. Therefore, no science can possibly directly observe absolute nature. This principle is illustrated by two facets of science. The first is the nature of scientific theories. Heisenberg has argued that science does not observe nature directly because it observes nature within the constraints of its theories.

The observation of nature is impossible without the influence of a way of observing. To the lay public, "facts" about nature such as the laws of nature are supposed to exist apart from methods of observing them. But Toulmin has shown that "laws of nature" are ways of representing what is observed and are not nature itself. They are principles for drawing inferences and are constraints upon the observer, not upon reality.

A second facet of science that impedes any direct observation of
any direct reality is the nature of reduction itself, which has been assumed to be a necessary step towards such apprehension. If science reduces systems to parts it must avoid examining just the parts, for that would be much less useful even for its own purposes than the examination of whole particular systems. Examining isolated particulars in the aggregate, which mechanics must do as a consequence of reduction, causes objective physics to deal with ideals and not with realistic exactness concerning individual parts. The major feature of this focus on aggregates is that the aggregates are perceived mathematically, and this is a limitation. Science can then be said to know the mathematical structure of aggregates but not things in themselves. This last consequence of reduction leads to a further barrier between observation and reality. If physics does not examine things in themselves then it can only know things by examining their effects, and even then only their effects taken within the context of the aggregate to avoid misleading random variations. Physics can never know what changes, only the results of the change itself.

Mechanics relied not only upon direct observation but upon the avoidance of personal, social, or moral bias. It sought the detachment from science of the scientist. This goal is impossible for a number of reasons. At a very general level, Bronowski has observed that the practice of science compels the formation of values in the scientist. Observation cannot be value-free. But even if the personal values of the scientist did not exist, detachment of the observer from the observed would be impossible. The very nature of observation, the approach towards the observed by the scientist, is a linking of the two. Real detachment would mean no observation at all. Observation is participation, "a form of interaction or transaction." This relationship is doubly complex, for the unidirectional relationship blurs or reverses at times; the knower and the known reciprocally affect each other, and what the observer observes is the observed affected by the observation, which affects the observer's act of observing, and so on in infinite regression. This relationship is yet triply complex. Objects are not observed entirely in themselves and apart but as part of some background or context. Observation of this background will affect observation of the focal object, and then the complexities of reciprocity in observation apply here, too. The problem for mechanics is this: to be observed is to be different for the observer.

The conclusion of the preceding argument is that the notion of an
objective reality is not a useful concept in science or experience for a number of reasons. Positing objective reality as a concept may be the province of philosophy, but it is not helpful in the pursuit of knowledge. Indeed, it is not now helpful in many branches of science. Kuhn writes that "There is, I think, no theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like 'really there'; the notion of a match between the ontology of a theory and its 'real' counterpart in nature now seems to me illusive in principle." Science gets along very well using concepts whose "real" existence has never been proven such as ether and phlogiston in the past and certain subatomic particles in the present. Relativity in particular does not need or use the idea of an absolute reality. It views the world as events rather than things, and events are things that happen to certain observers, not for all to see in the same way. But perhaps the most important reason against the positing of objective reality in science, if the previous argument against objective observation is accepted, is that such a postulate would never be testable and is thus a poor subject for science. Concerning objective reality, Wheelis argues that "we are free so to imagine; but then must accept that we have composed a fairy tale, not a theory, for it is by definition something that cannot be tested — like saying that turtles, when completely unobserved, become princes." If objective reality exists people will never know it. Thus, the only reality ever to be encountered is what is observed. The implication of that conclusion is that "reality" will be different with different ways of observing it. For everyday experience, reality will vary with different ways and forms of experiencing it: "This is to say that the world is what we experience — either directly or indirectly." To the extent that a person’s ways of observing and experiencing differ from other people’s then he/she can say that reality is different. Kuhn has shown this to be the case in the sciences, since "after a revolution scientists are responding to a different world." These are the considerations we must accept if we hold a non-mechanistic view of reality. Let me make two observations about this new reality to correspond with the observations in the last section. First, I would argue that intersubjective or process reality begs the question of personal experience quite as much as does mechanism although of course in a different way. While mechanics must assume the physical nature of human emotions, values, morals, and the essentially obfuscating nature of human faculties for the pursuit of knowledge, intersubjectivity begins with the assumption that an ob-
jective reality will be outside the realm of that philosophy's concerns. Again, these two points of view cannot argue meaningfully on the question of personal experience. Second, while mechanistic objectivity sought the eventual collapse of metaphysics and epistemology by coming directly to know all of reality, intersubjectivity seeks the same collapse but at this end of the philosophical tunnel. Intersubjectivity begins with the assumption that the study of what and how people know is nothing more or less than the study of the nature of reality. The very existence of a dichotomy between what humanity knows and what there is to know is Newtonian, and intersubjectivity begins with a denial of the dichotomy.

The nature of an intersubjective reality

The central tenet of intersubjectivity, or process, is ambiguity: the idea that there is no objective reality (or considerations of one are excluded). This idea was developed in the physical sciences, and has been taken up by some revisionist scholars in the social sciences and humanities. There is no one standard against which to compare experience, yet people nevertheless do have meaningful experiences and do not generally suffer from any feeling of unreality. Therefore, if reality is not objective then it must be the case that people make their own reality. This is not to say that I can conjure up whatever reality I like. The sense in which I mean that people make their own reality is that we must participate in making reality: "There are no appearances to be photographed, no experiences to be copied, in which we do not take part." To say that people participate in making reality is to say that reality, or what is observed, will be partially determined by the way in which people observe, which is a form of participation. Thus, the world is determined by nature and science jointly.

Let me make it clear that no modern Dr. Johnson need kick a stone to refute me. I am not arguing that I can dream up any reality I like. I am not arguing that reality is subjective. The constraints of sensory data are one bond between human beings and one reason why I cannot imagine a tree and have it appear. But sense data by themselves are not experience. Experience is sensation plus meaning. Sensation alone is meaningless. To all experiences people give meaning, a process which is inherently and uniquely human. It is in this sense that people make their own reality, for we give to experience its absolutely necessary component of meaning. I will argue for the idea
that meaning is of first importance in human affairs, and in a real sense reality is meaning.

The centrality of meaning should not be difficult to establish. Kuhn argues that in the sciences and elsewhere sensory stimuli may be the same, but the meanings given to the stimuli are quite different and will in effect constitute different realities: "Mere parochialism, I suspect, makes us suppose that the route from stimuli to sensation is the same for the members of all groups." No physical stimulus is inherently meaningful, for meaning must be given to experience, it is not a part of it automatically. Thus, the answer to the old question is that when a tree falls in the woods it does indeed make a sound, but the sound is perfectly meaningless since no person can hear it.

Now, the question is this: if objective reality does not exist, where will people get the reality that we do have? Which is to say, where will we get the meanings that we have? The answer is that people get meanings from other people through communication. This, Barnlund has argued, is the purpose of communication. Meaning is the essential component of the reality of relatively simple aspects of experience like rocks and trees. How much more is meaning an important part of complex political and social situations. Here especially do people get meanings from communication: "Therefore, meaning is not discovered in situations, but created by rhetors."

Let me briefly summarize. Reality is what experience means. This meaning is taken from personal experience and communication about it with others, the sharing of meaning. Intersubjectivity stems from the principle of no objective reality. From this principle two others are derived. First, if things do not take meaning from an objective reality then they must take meaning from other components in the systems of which they are a part. Things are not defined objectively but are defined by their contexts. Yet, since contexts are made up of other things which are also defined or given meaning by the context, it follows that everything in turn defines or gives meaning to other components of its context. This implies an important element of independence or self-determination for every person: I can define those things that in turn define me. A second principle stems from this first: that if contexts give meaning, then the meaning of a person or thing or idea is constantly changing. This is true for two reasons: a) any entity is a part of many different contexts, all of which may define it in different ways, and b) defining contexts are always changing: now I am a teacher, now a husband, now an insurance customer, etc.
This view of reality has often been called "process." Smith quotes Berlo's description of this idea with a focus on the idea of interdefinition of the components of a context: "The ingredients within a process interact; each affects all of the others." This idea of interdefinition is the source of meaning: "The basis for the concept of process is the belief that the structure of physical reality can not be discovered by man; it must be created by man."

To contrast this view of reality with other philosophies is useful. Scott draws a distinction between objectivity, which was examined in the first section, intersubjectivity, which I have just explained, and subjectivity, which is in its pure form solipsism. The difference among the three is essentially one of the source of our meanings: from objective reality, from others, or from ourselves alone. Pemberton has described this trichotomy as the "absolutistic," "transactionist," and "relativistic" perspectives. Stewart's basis for his philosophy of interpersonal communication is the "transactionist," or intersubjective point of view.

**Relevance of process or intersubjectivity to rhetoric**

Intersubjectivity is the most "realistic" way to view rhetoric. Scott has argued that rhetoric is not one-way, or a matter of a speaker influencing an audience, but involves mutual influence and interdefinitions. This relevance of intersubjectivity to rhetoric I will explore further. But I will also argue that rhetoric is the most "realistic" way to view intersubjectivity. I will show that acceptance of this point of view places rhetoric squarely at the heart of one's world view.

Intersubjectivity holds that the discovery of reality and the testing of it is never independent of people but takes place through people. Yet this reality is found through communication between people if humanity is to escape solipsism. Reality is meaning yet meaning is something created and discovered in communication. Boulding argues that the "image," which is essentially reality, is built up of messages. This theory has no room for the idea of "facts" without accounting for communicating about those facts. The images that people have which are made by communication are the only ideas of reality people will ever have, for these images can only be compared to other images and never to objective reality. This is what Scott means when he argues that no duality exists between fact and symbol; what is symbolized will be the facts, and the intersubjective way of discovering facts is to symbolize (or com-
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municate) with others. Bormann has essentially agreed in arguing that the most meaningful reality to people will often not be "facts" or objective reality but rather the rhetorical reality created by communication.

Humans are necessarily involved in sharing and manipulating messages to give and gain meanings about experience. But what experience means is not by any means agreed upon. This ambiguity is a feature of the essentially rhetorical nature of reality. Ambiguity generates conflict and disagreement about meaning and a constant striving to resolve these divisions. This striving is rhetoric; while rhetoric may be defined in many ways and on many levels, it is in the deepest and most fundamental sense the advocacy of realities.

Let me approach this point from two more beginnings: that reality is shared and that it can be changed. The first point I have made repeatedly: "the world — so far from being a solid matter of fact — is rather a fabric of conventions . . . ." Conventions are shared meaning; in Boulding's terms, they are "images," and are the only sort of "facts" ever encountered. The shared nature of this reality is quite important. Participation in shared meanings are requisites for participation in society: madness is by definition an inability to share conventional meanings. Indeed, the reliance upon shared conventions may be so great that it obscures the arbitrary, nonobligatory nature of many meanings. Vatz argues that "consensual symbolism" may so "ritualize" events that their rhetorically induced character may go unrecognized. Indeed, Vatz's indictment of Bitzer is essentially an attempt to call attention to the conventional nature of highly "ritualized" situations.

Now here is the crux of the matter: only if reality is shared, that is to say created by discourse, can it be changed or altered by discourse. This is seen in the link between "social reality" or shared meanings and the "rhetorical vision" or the impulse to change meaning, in Bormann's analysis. Today's social reality is yesterday's rhetorical vision. Scott has expanded the sense of the changeability of reality to include "the most everyday sort of occurrences." The point here is that wherever meanings are shared they are shared only because discourse has the power to induce people to participate in that shared reality. The same power may be used to change the reality.

Boulding's analysis of how reality changes is interesting and patently rhetorical. Reality is meaning. But the meaning of messages or the reality they advocate are the changes produced in the image
This focus on change means that meaning only occurs to the extent that messages cause change; that which does not change the image is meaningless. Boulding recognizes this as rhetorical, for he argues that persuasion is the art of changing others' images. Boulding has also presented an interesting perspective on political rhetoric. The political process, he argues, is the mutual modification of images. That which ties groups of people together in a society is their shared public image. Although a common image, this shared meaning still grows out of the minds of the individuals within that system. How does this image change? How do individual minds generate a collective change? Boulding says that a change in the public image comes about through the efforts of a few creative individuals who urge upon others some change in the image. These few creative minds may be taken to be the orators and rhetoricians of a society. They cause the radical changes in an ever-changing reality.

Part III: Rhetoric and Truth

Certainty is certainty, whether it issues from the Vatican or from the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory.

— Allen Wheelis

In this section I will attempt to develop some grounds for an ethic of rhetoric that is consistent with an intersubjective or process point of view. I will argue that the most ethical world view is one with rhetoric at its center. I will be most concerned with the term "truth," what it means for mechanistic philosophy, and what it means for process. Scott argues that "truth" traditionally has two meanings.

One meaning is that truth is the conformity of a proposition to reality. Thus, the "truth" of "this tree is green" may be established by examining the tree itself to see if it is green. This meaning of truth implies physical verifiability. It essentially deals with physical reality. A second meaning is that truth is some ideal standard that exists apart from humanity. This meaning of truth implies philosophical verifiability and refers to an idealist reality. In this sense some absolute standard of social or symbolic realities exists such as "beauty," or "justice," or "honesty," and to discover that standard is to discover the truth.

Both of the meanings of truth given above are tied to epistemology. They involve finding out about something that people do not know about already: the "truth." They require a dichotomy
between the nature of reality and the ways of finding out about reality. They both assume truth to be correspondence of ideas to reality. But perhaps this will not do for intersubjectivity, for it collapses metaphysics and epistemology into one mode of inquiry. Objective reality is dispensed with; intersubjectivity is assumed. So if truth in mechanics is the correspondence of ideas to reality, what is truth in process? It is the same thing; but the different definitions of "reality" are the crux of the distinction. Intersubjective truth is still the correspondence of ideas to reality, but remember that the reality is now an intersubjective one. Many writers with this point of view will claim that truth is "relative." By this I believe they mean not that truth is solipsistic but that truth will be determined by the changing contexts in which people move. For each context there will be a different truth. Thus, Boulding argues that truth is "relative," and means by this that any given subculture will generate some standards to serve as "truth" for its members. This process notion of truth attempts to explain how it is that people face contradictory "truths." The problem is to resolve these contradictions by reference to one objective standard. No such standard exists. Truths are contradictory precisely because they are relative and relative because human-made: "truth lies in man." 

This explanation leaves a number of questions unanswered: 1) Some notion of "truth" is still a part of moral experience. People feel justified in claiming ideas as "true" or not. People sometimes feel justified in indicting contexts and social groups as promoting untruths. How can the intersubjectivist still use the term with objective implications? 2) People use the term in the sense of checking on physical experience. I have argued that everything that is meaningful in experience is reality, but people occasionally ask if personal reality is "true" or is it illusion. If I see a pink elephant I will want to know if the reality of that experience is "true." How is the term used here? 3) "Truth" is closely bound up with the question of "ethics." Ethics attempts to discover the truth about the best way to behave. Does a relative truth destroy ethics? How is it possible to make ethical judgments if truth is not absolute?

*Intersubjective truth and the verification of experience*

Let me consider these first two questions together, since they essentially involve the notion of truth as the confirmation of experience. These questions correspond to Scott's two kinds of truth, idealist and physical. The problem is one of verification of experience.
Truth refers to the correspondence of our physical and cognitive experience with reality. In Newtonian terms, if my experience of X is that it is thus, and it is thus in objective reality, then my experience is true. I know the truth about X. But no objective standard exists in intersubjectivity. Reality in process is, instead, shared meanings. Therefore, truth, for the individual, is the extent to which the meanings of experience (that is to say, reality) of that individual are shared by significant others. Truth is agreement. If nobody else shares the meaning that I give to sensory data, then I will usually conclude that those meanings are not true, and I will try to grasp the meanings others give to that experience. Once I assign shared meanings to my experience, then that meaning is true. The reader will foresee the fulfillment of one of my aims if he/she recalls that this reality of shared meanings was described as a rhetorical reality in the last section.

This notion of truth implies degrees of truth. Suppose I see something, and the meaning that I give to this sensation is that here is a pink elephant. Since I want to know if that is what I truly see I will ask someone if they see it, too. If nobody does, then I can be fairly certain that I must remove the meaning “pink elephant” from that experience, and I instead assign the meaning of “hallucination.” I then say that it is not really (reality = shared meanings) a pink elephant. Now suppose that in a group of ten people, two others saw this elephant. I might still think I was hallucinating, but I would be much less sure. I would think that perhaps there “really” was a pink elephant there. And if five of the ten saw it? Then I would be more sure. In these degrees of certainty are degrees of truth. The more my meaning is shared the more true I assume it to be.

Now for some comments and retractions on my argument so far. I have referred to the sharing of meanings with significant others. By this I mean that people restrict standards of comparison to certain contexts and not to others. People decide who and what in particular situations and issues will be the validating context for our meanings. I would not choose as my validating context in the pink elephant issue, for example, the denizens of Joe’s Bar. Or if I did, I would want to ask some others, too.

Question number one above asked how it is that we can challenge our social contexts and groups as to the truth of some symbolic or idealist meaning. This question becomes increasingly important if truth is determined by shared meanings. The question is answered by the notion of validating contexts and the element of personal
choice and personal influence on the other elements of interdefining contexts to which I referred when defining "process." People can choose to limit validating contexts to only the individual (although I believe that this is rarely done outside of madness). This limiting is possible only if people participate in defining, as well as being defined by, contexts. The individual can challenge the world's shared meanings if he/she believes that he/she is the only person who can validate his/her own meanings.

Question number two above was concerned with the feeling that an absolute standard of truth must exist for verification of sensory experience. I would argue that what are regarded as such standards are actually widely shared or ritualized meanings. They may be meanings that have rarely or never been contradicted. The most fundamental truths are those meanings most universally shared. This leads to one of my conclusions in this section. The intersubjectivist finds truth in agreement with significant others. Yet agreement does not stand still. It is made and unmade by rhetorical discourse. Others are not mirrors that reflect the world back to us. They are active agents that urge meanings upon us. When people seek intersubjective truth by comparing their meanings they are involved in rhetoric; for some meanings will be advocated and some scorned, some chosen and some abandoned. In the last section I argued that only in an intersubjective world created by rhetorical beings could rhetoric be central. But more than that; a world view in which truth is agreement must have rhetoric at its heart, for agreement is gained in no other way.

The feeling that contradictory truths exist, or that we can challenge our social groups, is accounted for by this notion of truth. Conflicting truths arise when two or more validating contexts have opposed meanings. For example, people may be torn between the desire to further the common welfare and the desire to protect self-interests. This conflict is possible because the meanings assigned to either pattern are generated by different validating contexts. Motivations for one context or another are in a rhetorical opposition that presents the individual with a choice. That choice raises the question of how it is that people perceive process systems as such and choose between them. Such issues are important but beyond the scope of this paper.

The desire for truth is closely linked to a Newtonian desire for certainty in an indeterminate world. Many seek to find certainty, if not in ethical choices, then in the sciences. Surely certain truths lie here.
But this is not the case. The model nature of scientific theory prevents this certainty. Kuhn has shown us the extent to which certainties and truths change with paradigms. What scientists are sure of is not reality but rather the internal mathematical workings of their models which may or may not match experience. Toulmin puts it like this: "Scientists will never be entitled to say to the public . . . that the universe is a machine . . . Models remain models, however far-reaching and fruitful their applications may become."

Certainty is often considered a measure of knowledge. Wheelis writes that "knowledge is the name we give to those of our opinions to which certainty is ascribed." If this is true then it is consistent with the implications of what I have already argued. If I know something with certainty then I share its meanings with a great many people in a great many contexts.

**Rhetoric, ethics, and truth**

I will now attempt to answer the third question that I posed at the start of this section, concerned with the possibility of a "relative" ethic for rhetoric that is based on intersubjectivity. I will argue that in many ways such an ethic is not only possible but much to be preferred over objective ethics.

Let me begin by describing an ethical Scylla and Charybdis to be avoided. Both posit an objective reality, although in extremely different ways. I will first analyze idealist ethics and then semanticist ethics.

Idealist ethics, specifically in rhetoric, made its most important early appearance in Plato. Platonic rhetoric assumes that an absolute truth exists and that the task is to find this truth and employ rhetoric in its service to "treat the soul." The question is, what sort of objective truth is this? For an answer turn to that friend of traditional rhetoric, Richard Weaver, who is certainly an idealist. Weaver felt that this objective truth was one of ideas, principles, and forms. This focus on the idea is, of course, opposed to the physical orientation of mechanism, but the certainty that Weaver assigns to the Ideal is just as great. The ideal serves as the standard of ultimate good, a fixed standard against which to measure the specific things one would call good. Keep in mind that this ideal order of goods is, according to Weaver, independent of anything else, and that rhetoric, far from creating the good, serves it. This idealist truth is discovered, not by rhetoric, but by the logical process of "dialectic." Rhetoric then serves a subsidiary function:
"rhetoric seeks actualization of a dialectically secured position in the existential world." Weaver's kind of objective truth is to be found in many philosophies that are otherwise opposed to him. Bitzer is probably not a Weaverian idealist, yet Vatz has shown that Bitzer's "situation" implies a similar kind of ethical objectivity.

Let me stress certain aspects of idealist ethics in rhetoric. An objective truth is assumed. The task is to find it, then to "actualize" it. This task implies a dichotomy between the realm of objective truth and the realm of experience. The implication is that finding the truth alone is inadequate for its implementation and that not just everyone can find it. The truth is a special order of ideas that is possible not to know. Rhetoric remedies that ignorance. The implication is also clear that rhetoric is a channel for truth, a servant of truth. To the extent that rhetoric is at all creative, or adds anything to "reality," then it must be indicted by the idealist, for its task is only to make effective the truth. It cannot create or add to the truth.

Semanticist ethics for rhetoric is also objective. Matson has shown that the semanticist and logical positivist traditions grow out of mechanism. In these philosophies language needs to be made to match a supposed objective reality to reduce confusion and misunderstanding. I will take as illustrative of semanticists H. I. Hayakawa, a gentleman who caused Weaver no small amount of grief. Hayakawa is certainly of mechanist sympathies; he praises science in terms of its abilities to predict and its restriction to physical or "extensional" reality. Hayakawa views language and its use, rhetorical or otherwise, in terms of the relationship between a map and a territory, with the implication that a good map will report a territory and not include mountains and valleys and rivers where there are none in objective reality. This view of language as objectively reporting seems to be widespread. It even creeps into Heisenberg, who argues that while language has "immediate connection with reality," science does not, implying a dichotomy between language and reality over which to have such a connection.

It is plain that while Hayakawa recognizes the existence and uses of rhetoric and describes some strategies in his book, he eyes rhetoric with suspicion. This is only natural given his orientation. "Facts," he believes, if properly reported can be "affective" (that is to say, rhetorical) without "literary devices" (that is to say, rhetoric) to make them so. While Weaver regarded rhetoric as the servant of truth, Hayakawa's view implies the rejection of rhetoric altogether unless it reports objective reality. Then it would no longer be rhetoric.
as such but merely the utterance of truth which is sufficient to move people to accept it. Hayakawa does not preclude a dialectic to discover the truth, but it will be a dialectic of mechanical science to discover a truth of fact rather than one of idea. To the extent that rhetoric urges anything that cannot be seen with a microscope, then it is superfluous at best and obfuscating at worst.

I will attempt to avoid the two positions of semanticism and idealism with an ethics of process. I will argue that intersubjectivity is more "realistic" and more responsible by attacking first semantic ethics and then idealism.

The more people recognize and accept grounds for ethical responsibility the more ethical human life will be. Within the scope of this paper I cannot describe or urge specific ethical guidelines, but I am concerned with establishing the grounds for ethical judgments. Whatever ethical standards are taken, the more often people are constrained to compare actions and judgment with those standards, the more will people conform to those standards. Now, the trouble with Hayakawa is that he does not grant language or rhetoric any ethics per se. They are only subject to ethical evaluation to the extent that they report or do not report objective reality. But they are not subject to evaluation in and of themselves. This is all very good within his perspective, but an intersubjective perspective will grant language and rhetoric ethical status.

From an intersubjective point of view, language is indeed subject to ethical considerations. This is because it creates the meanings that are reality, and does so as much as or more than does physical sensation. I.A. Richards has developed a philosophy suited to this view of rhetoric. While process posits the interdefinition of a system, Richards goes further to posit interdefinition or "interdependence of meaning" for language alone. Whereas in process the meaning of a component is determined by its context, in Richards' view the meaning of a word is its "delegated efficacy," by which he means the missing part of its context. While each word means what it means by virtue of its context, so each word is part of the context for some other word and influences other words in turn. This is, of course, process in language. Just as changing or multiple contexts affect the meaning of process components, so do the contexts of language create an ambiguity as to the meaning of words. This ambiguity creates and requires the ability of language to create meanings, that is to say reality, and thus ambiguity is an important resource of language. Richards argues that his context theory of the meanings
of language avoids the semanticist notion that words are restricted to some one meaning that they ought to have.\textsuperscript{92} That restriction cannot exist if language is ambiguous. Thus, Richards gives to language itself an element of choice. Because it is ambiguous and because it creates reality it is the responsibility of the user of language to choose between the reality that his/her language will advocate. This choice is ethical, and it is also rhetorical. It gives to rhetoric itself an ethical ground and is thus preferable to Hayakawa’s denial of ethics to rhetoric.

Intersubjective ethics is also preferable to idealist ethics because, again, it offers or demands more ethical accountability. Weaver is very concerned with ethics, and his charge to the rhetor to discover the truth is an admirable and an ethical one. But in Weaver’s system, ethical responsibility must inevitably stop at the point that one discovers the truth and actualizes it. It must stop precisely because of the power of the supposed objective truth. Having found the truth, the idealist cannot claim that truth as his/hers and cannot be held accountable for the consequences of the actualization of truth. After all, Truth is being urged by the idealist rhetor, a truth that is the rhetor’s responsibility to find, but the rhetor is not responsible for that truth itself. The consequences of that truth are charged to the account of Truth, not to the rhetor who is only an agency. This creates for the rhetor a waiver of responsibility at best. At worst, as Scott has shown, it provides the kind of “rationalization” that fanatics feed on.\textsuperscript{93}

A better alternative is intersubjectivity. Here, the rhetor still has the responsibility to discover his/her truth in the sense that I have discussed truth so far. But the rhetor also has the responsibility to recognize that this truth is his/her responsibility, and its actualization and consequences are his/her responsibility, for he/she is part of the context that determines in part how others will view reality. Thus, process requires greater ethical responsibility from one end of dialectic to the last consequences of rhetoric.\textsuperscript{94} The idea that the truth that is being argued is created as well as discovered puts a greater responsibility on the rhetor. While I am avoiding specific ethical charges, Scott has suggested some good ones for intersubjective truth: toleration, will, and responsibility.\textsuperscript{95}

Because the rhetor is responsible for the truth that he/she advocates, he/she is less likely to make the extreme claims for it that irresponsibility encourages. Wheelis put this point very well when he wrote: “Certainty leads us to attack evil; being less sure we would
but resist it. The difference between attack and resistance is the difference between violence and argument, the thread on which our lives dangle." Knowledge of the possibility of other truths, that is to say, opposed shared meanings, will reduce certainty of the truth the rhetor advocates. This awareness of other truths must stem from an ethic in which truth itself is rhetorically made by agreement, not given or found absolutely. Such a rhetorical ethic is possible only in intersubjectivity.

Process is a point of view good not only for ethics but for rhetoric. Idealist rhetoric assumes that people are deficient in apprehension of the truth, that people would not need rhetoric if humankind could see the truth unaided. Thus, rhetoric's place is as the servant of truth. Because the truth must be discovered rather than created, rhetoric actually becomes parasitic to those studies which can tell what that truth or reality is. Rhetoric for the semanticist is only subsidiary to the science that discovers truth. Neither the idealist nor the semanticist gives to rhetoric the power to create truth. Only in a process philosophy do we find, as Scott has noted, that no choice exists between discovering and creating truth, we will inevitably do the latter. In a process point of view, indeed in any philosophy that does not discount daily experience, the truths that people can be sure of are bound to be trivial. Rhetoric deals with creating the more important truths that guide choices. Thus, rhetoric in process is doubly ethical: it is the result of a choice on the part of the rhetor as to the reality advocated and the method of doing so, and it urges choice rather than complete and necessary acceptance on the part of the audience. Truth which is rhetorically made encourages choice and awareness of alternative realities. Idealist ethics removes that choice and makes acceptance of objective reality an obligation.

Part IV: Process and Rhetorical Methodology

Is not subjectivity in knowing like pregnancy in a convent, whereof the smallest amount is much too much?

—Allen Wheelis

. . . . nor is it shameful for man to sit down when he thinks.

—Otis Walter

Given the description of intersubjective reality and rhetoric which I have discussed, I will assume in this section that the object of inquiry in rhetorical study will be meaning and the way in which
meanings are created, shared, and changed. I hope to describe a proper methodological perspective for that kind of study within the process point of view. I cannot within the scope of this paper discuss an intersubjective perspective for "rhetorical criticism" itself. My concern is with the relationship between the experimental method and methods of rhetorical criticism. The present discussion is restricted to that relationship because some scholars may mistakenly feel that intersubjectivity must imply antagonism between experiment and more holistic forms of criticism. I have shown at the start of this paper that the study of humanity borrowed its philosophy and method from Newton and then rejected mechanics with Heisenberg and others. In accordance with the spirit of this eternal following after, I will borrow a methodological perspective from "post-modern" or process-oriented science.

Intersubjectivity in science

Let me begin by elaborating a point that has been made before. Natural science is not the objective observation of anything at all. It is instead the personal involvement of the scientist with the observed. As such, science depends on a point of view. Science grows not by mere accumulation of data as does natural history but by changes in perspectives.101 This is a point of Kuhn's book: that science changes by paradigm shifts which do not represent the accumulation of knowledge but rather the reconstruction of data.102 Thus, science is a way of seeing the world which involves the active participation of the scientist in making that point of view.103 What is meant when one refers to a "discovery" in science is rarely that something new is observed but rather that something old is observed in quite a different way, and that way is chosen by the scientist.104 Kuhn's idea of a paradigm as shared by a community of scholars describes the paradigm as an intersubjective reality. It is something created by people, not found in objective reality. Therefore, in the social sciences and humanities where the object of study is intersubjective reality, to the extent that this inquiry proceeds according to various paradigms it will be the intersubjective study of the intersubjective.

The notion of science and scientific change as reconstructions of data is the first point I would like to make. But how can science reconstruct? What do theories do? Science seeks to discover unity in the data that it analyzes.105 But this unity does not necessarily exist objectively in nature; at any rate, if it does, people will never know it. The unity that science seeks in data is a unity that science gives to
data. Laws of nature are created by the scientist rather than discovered. They are created to facilitate the understanding of nature. In this sense, Bronowski has argued, art and science are very much alike. Both seek to recreate and unify experience, rather than simply report it. This means that science, like art, will be a creative process. The scientist has no choice but to be creative. Nothing is given to the senses in a whole or organized form. The scientist and the artist, indeed, everybody that perceives anything must perceive by organizing partial impressions. This perception of unity is absolutely necessary to any inquiry. In science, regularity must be conceived before experimentation can begin. The need for an organizing perspective is as important in the study of rhetoric as it is in the "hard" sciences.

Let me make an observation that will tie this section to the one before. Involved creativity on the part of the scientist is a compulsory choice. The scientist cannot choose not to participate in observation but must decide among alternative ways of observing and objects to be observed. To the extent that methodology in science is a choice then ethics will lie at the heart of methodology. If the critic can apply these methods of science to rhetoric, rhetorical inquiry is itself a matter of choice and is ethical. Process rhetorical research will be an ethical examination of the ethical and a responsible inquiry into the responsible.

Assumptions of process methodology

Smith has specified five "methodological assumptions" for research that are consistent with process or intersubjective reality. They are: 1) objectivity is not assumed, 2) the nature of the observer’s perspective is stipulated, 3) different explanations are allowed, 4) different explanations may be held simultaneously, and 5) research is conducted with a holistic point of view. I will not quarrel with these except to modify this last point, but I would like to add to these prescriptions. Smith does not explain the relationship between the use of experimentation in persuasion and the use of more conventional rhetorical criticism. What are the assumptions of mechanical experimentation? Objectivity of the observer and reduction of the observed. Yet process denies objectivity. Does reduction then have a place in intersubjectivity? At first blush it would seem that intersubjectivity would deny the propriety of observing a component as meaningful apart from the context that gives it meaning. I believe that a common assumption among "humanists" is that ex-
perimentation alone would not seem to satisfy intersubjective views of reality. Does it have any place in rhetorical research at all?

In the first place, scholars should as a matter of principle be wary of banishing any form of inquiry. To the extent that experimentation has something to offer, it should make that contribution. The sciences themselves recognize that no point of view is adequate to explain all of reality. Toulmin argues that scientific theories are not limited by the "truth" but by the scope of their application which may be limited to special parts of science.¹¹² Kuhn has shown that different aspects of science may embrace different and incompatible paradigms.¹¹³

I will argue that the questions I raised at the start of this subsection were questions concerning experimentation performed within the mechanistic point of view. The crucial issue in any methodology is not so much what is done but what is made of the data that are gathered. More important than the experimental focus which produces data is the organizing and guiding perspective which interprets that data. Experiment in mechanism is objectionable not for what it does but for the constructions placed upon data gathered by objectified, simplified, mathematical procedures. Rasmussen has shown this point very well in arguing that no methodology is inherently process or mechanistic but depends on interpretation of data.¹¹⁴ Rasmussen has criticized Smith's suggestion of certain specific methodological procedures by showing that none of these procedures is inherently process oriented.¹¹⁵

I will attempt to develop a productive attitude for joining the experimental and traditional methods of research in rhetoric into a paradigm appropriate to a process reality. This paradigm will be Michael Polanyi's philosophy of focal and subsidiary or tacit knowledge. I will preview a more specific explanation of this philosophy with a brief summary of it. Focal knowledge is knowledge gained by attending to some particular object in and of itself. Subsidiary knowledge is a holistic, intuitive knowledge of the focal object in its background or context. The observer attends from subsidiary knowledge to focal knowledge; or examines particulars within a sense of their relationship to a context. Both are necessary but neither is sufficient alone for full knowledge of the object of study.

The experimental method corresponds to focal knowledge and has been explained elsewhere. I will at this point argue for the role of holism and intuition in the pursuit of knowledge. Polanyi has shown
that knowledge can never be purely focal or restricted but must include some subsidiary awareness of the context of a thing. Yet a thing has an infinite context. How is the observer to know this infinite context so as to place the object of focal awareness in some sort of perspective? Only through a holistic point of view can the observer comprehend in any way this infinity of context while focusing on some particulars within the context. Knowledge of people (and this would include rhetoric) must include this element of holism. The scholar must study people with a subsidiary awareness of their contexts, and this means not only holism but also a study of the person as an individual rather than merely reducing him/her to his/her parts. This concern for the person as a whole rather than some particular drive or physiological response of the person is necessary because a person's actions can be explained within the motivating context for the whole person rather than for the reduced parts of the person. The infinite ranges of contexts in which people move that define their particular actions in ever-changing ways requires a sort of holistic knowledge that Polanyi calls an infinite range of "anticipations."

A holistic component of methodology is important because intersubjective reality demands the assumption of purpose and self-determination for the person as well as definition by one's context. Yet the purposes that people have can never be examined directly and in isolation. Purpose is largely discoverable by "tacit knowledge" or "subsidiary awareness" in Polanyi's terms. Intuition or tacit knowledge plays an important part in Polanyi's epistemology. People know things, in part, holistically. Yet no rules can be found for determining how people know, how we discover regularities and unities in the observed — we simply know. Polanyi posits an infinite range of peripheral cues that determine holistic perception, but these cues are always internal and out-of-awareness.

So a holistic/intuitive perspective is a necessary part of knowledge, as is a focal/experimental component. The question is, why is Polanyi's system the most appropriate one for the study of a process reality?

I have argued that the experimental method alone is insufficient for process investigations. Even the experimental method taken with what often passes for a process perspective is insufficient. If parts of a system take their meaning from the system then an experimental focus upon isolated components alone will never have a perspective
on the rest of the system that gives those components meaning. To assume that experimental research can meet process requirements by specifying and examining all the relevant parts of a context over time is a mistake. This, for example, is what Brooks and Scheidel have done in a recent monograph.\textsuperscript{123} The trouble is, one can never name all the variables in a context and one can never specify all the contexts that may give relevant definitions to the components focused upon. One can never settle on the contexts that define the observed. So the experimental method alone can never account for the defining nature of contexts in process. But on the other hand the researcher must close off the system at some point and say that this is what I will study. The experimental method has at least two valuable characteristics which holism does not. It can examine particular things more completely in themselves rather than as part of a context. This focus upon the specific and particular is a perspective upon the object of study which is missed by holism. Also, experimentation more clearly accepts the idea that restriction of human attention at some point is necessary for inquiry to begin at all. Observation must eventually come to focus on something. At some time attention must be focal, must be on one component of a system, and must freeze the meaning of a component to study it, although in process reality the meaning may be changing all the time. Some measure of isolation and reduction is as necessary as is an awareness of the larger system that the isolated and reduced component is a part of. Subsidiary knowledge is the necessary component of a methodology that wants to include a process awareness of some system; and focal awareness is necessary to settle upon some object of study since a purely holistic procedure would focus on the entire universe, and the only relevant tool would be the syllable "Aum."

Experimentalism and holism together are necessary for fullest knowledge of an object within the process perspective. I will now try to apply this idea to the study of rhetoric. By way of preliminary assumptions is seems to be that the spirit behind rhetorical criticism, as opposed to experiment concerned with persuasion, is holistic. Some scholars criticize and some experiment, but rarely do the twain meet in the same publication. The rhetorical critic is certainly concerned with the relevance of his/her study to other knowledge, but he/she is not so concerned with prediction and control. While rhetorical criticism involves focal knowledge, the focus is not quite as sharp as in experimentation. The methodology of most rhetorical
criticism seems to be on balance the expression of a holistic understanding of the rhetoric studied.

What is the relationship between holism and experimentation in rhetorical study? I will argue first that holism is necessary in order to gain a perspective from which to draw intersubjective conclusions from experimental data. Part of the advantage of holism in rhetorical study is that it can deal best with many questions that experimentation cannot directly or quickly attack. Walter has argued that “in a world in which half the population is starving and the other half can blow the rest into eternal oblivion, it makes little difference whether, for example, climax order or anticlimax order is sometimes somewhat more or sometimes somewhat less effective.” Walter is unfair here. If experimenters were to discover that climax order could in an experiment persuade people then that would be a useful thing to know. But the trick is to apply that knowledge, gleaned from college sophomores in some laboratory, to the “real world.” How will the scholar use that knowledge, what questions can that knowledge address, and how and where does it need to be modified? Matters of morality and choice, of the merits of blowing the world up or not, are not open to experimental investigation. Nor are questions of how to apply restricted experimental findings to the infinity of experience. These applications must involve holistic awareness of the systems in which the focal knowledge is to be applied. Walter has complained that only the easy problems are quantitive. Problems of choice and morality are not. Yet the quantifiable problems are not really the whole problems; they can generate answers which serve a holistic perspective on the whole systems. This is what Wheelis means when he argues that the ends of knowledge are determined by faith (or holism) while science gives us the means to reach those ends. The point is not that the easy problems are quantifiable but that the very small components of great problems are quantifiable. Holism is necessary to guide and integrate findings that experimentation gives to us.

Holism in the study of rhetoric gives a perspective to the findings of experimentation. It does this more so than does mechanism for mechanism assumes that experimentation properly done will discover a truth that can stand by itself and is in need of no guiding or orienting perspective. But in an intersubjective reality this is not the case. Isolation of a system’s parts, which inevitably occurs in experimentation, results in some problems. Polanyi argues that isolation inevitably leaves out parts of the system, which I have dis-
cussed above; it also changes the appearance of the isolated parts. At this point behaviorism stops. Having isolated components of a system it draws conclusions about the components and system based on the limited data that it has. Intersubjective methodology, however, will recognize that any act of observation must change the appearance of the observed because it has been isolated from a system, because the meaning has been frozen so that the observer can look at it. The trick is to take what experimentation can tell about that isolated segment of a system and apply that data back again to the system which has been evolving all along. This is possible only through a holistic perspective that can take into account the infinite range of changes, meanings, and contexts necessary to apply experimental knowledge to changing intersubjective systems. This perspective involves the integration of both focal and subsidiary awareness; it cannot tell about rhetoric by proceeding in only one way.

Note that the experimental or focal and the holistic methods are opposed to each other. In a certain sense, isolation precludes integration and vice versa. Yet both are complementary to each other in arriving at the fullest knowledge possible. Complementarity is an idea well known to the sciences, particularly quantum mechanics, and the study of rhetoric would do well to borrow it. Matson describes the advantages of this point of view:

The inference . . . is not, of course, that the systematic search for natural causes and coefficient correlations must be abandoned forthwith in human affairs, nor that explanation in the qualitative terms of reason and free will is alone sufficient to account for all behavior. The point is rather that the two alternative perspectives or frames of reference are complementary: i.e., mutually exclusive if applied simultaneously but mutually "tolerant" if considered as opposite sides of the same coin — differing faces of the same reality.

Polanyi agrees in arguing that focal and subsidiary knowledge are complementary ways of regarding the same reality: "Focal and subsidiary awareness are definitely not two degrees of attention but two kinds of attention given to the same particulars." I have argued that these two kinds of knowing, while opposed, can work together in order to give the observer the specifics of knowledge and the perspective with which to apply that knowledge to systems. Polanyi
describes the advantages of both kinds of knowledge working together:

The concerted advantage of the two processes arises from the fact that normally every dismemberment of a whole adds more to its understanding than is lost through the concurrent weakening of its comprehensive features, and again each new integration of the particulars adds more to our understanding of them than it damages our understanding by somewhat effacing their identity.\textsuperscript{133}

Other authors have also argued for similar, complementary ways of knowing about something. Maslow argues a need for both "experiential" and "spectator" knowledge,\textsuperscript{134} and says that these methods represent complementary ways of knowing.\textsuperscript{135}

Summary

My purpose has been to show that rhetoric is a perspective which is quite important for understanding intersubjectivity and that intersubjectivity is important for understanding the centrality of rhetoric in human affairs. My purpose has been to show some, but by no means all, of the implications of process or intersubjective philosophy for the study of rhetoric. To generalize my conclusions while ignoring many smaller ones, I have advanced arguments in four areas. First, I attempted to describe the mechanistic world view that I believe intersubjectivity addressed most directly. Second, I attempted to describe the process or intersubjective world view. My purpose there was to place rhetoric at the heart of that world and to place process at the heart of rhetoric. Third, I attempted to specify some grounds for ethics in rhetoric as opposed to mechanistic or objective points of view. I particularly contrasted process ethics with the ethics of idealism and semantics. Finally, I attempted to suggest a methodological perspective for the study of rhetoric which would be consistent with process. My concern was to reconcile the vital traditions of experimentation and rhetorical criticism which some scholars may view as opposed or antagonistic. This synthesis was done by reference to Michael Polanyi's system of focal and subsidiary awareness.
NOTES

4 Matson, p. 11.
5 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
6 Wheelis, p. 29.
7 Matson, p. 4.
8 Wheelis, pp. 23-24.
9 Ibid., p. 3.
10 Matson, p. 69.
11 Ibid., p. 15.
12 Wheelis, p. 35.
15 Maslow, p. 8.
16 Matson, p. 39.
17 Ibid., p. 56.
18 Ibid., pp. 88-89.
19 Maslow, p. ix.
20 Matson, p. 30.
22 Ibid., p. 178.
23 Ibid., pp. 176-177.
26 Heisenberg, p. 5.
28 Ibid., pp. 71-72.
29 Matson, p. 117.
31 Ibid., p. 143.
33 Wheelis, pp. 56-57.
34 Matson, p. 129.
35 Wheelis, p. 78.
38 Toulmin, p. 137.
39 Russell, p. 140.
40 Wheelis, pp. 62-63.
41 Heisenberg, p. 58.

43 Kuhn, p. 111.
44 Matson, p. 121.
45 Bronowski, p. 20.
46 Kuhn, pp. 111-112.
48 Matson, p. 84.


51 Smith, 175.
55 Stewart, pp. 8-12.
56 Scott, "On Not . . .," pp. 89-90.
63 Vatz, p. 160.
64 Bormann, p. 398.
72 Wheelis, p. 83.
73 Boulding, p. 167.
75 Toulmin, p. 167.
76 Wheelis, p. 81.
81 Weaver, p. 71.
82 Johannesen, Strickland, Eubanks in Weaver, p. 19.
83 Vatz, pp. 154-155.
84 Matson, p. 93.
87 Heisenberg, pp. 200-201.
88 Hayakawa, p. 127.
89 Richards, p. 10.
93 Scott, “Existentialism,” p. 274.
94 Vatz, p. 158.
96 Wheelis, p. 114.
98 Vatz, pp. 157-158.
101 Toulmin, p. 53.
102 Kuhn, pp. 84-85.
104 Toulmin, p. 20.
105 Polanyi, p. 138.
106 Wheelis, p. 43.
107 Bronowski, p. 19.
110 Toulmin, p. 111.
111 Smith, p. 179.
112 Toulmin, p. 31.
113 Kuhn, p. 50.
116 Marjorie Grene, introduction to Polanyi’s *Knowing and Being*, p. ix.
117 Maslow, pp. 10-11.
118 Matson, p. 236.
119 Polanyi, p. 141.
120 Maslow, p. 18.
121 Polanyi, p. 107.
124 Walter, p. 376.
125 Wheelis, p. 89.
126 Walter, p. 380.
127 Wheelis, p. 108.
128 Polanyi, p. 124.
131 Matson, p. 136.
132 Polanyi, p. 128.
134 Maslow, p. 49.